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INTRODUCTION

The papers at this conference generally focus on the rise of
securitization and the possibility that statutes designed to remedy abuses
of securitization will wreak undue havoc on our capital markets. I take
my starting point from the relatively intractable policy questions that
those problems raise. It seems well accepted that securitization
provides financing at lower cost to the large companies that use those
transactions. 1 If so, rules fostering securitization could enhance the
overall performance of our economy. At the same time, there are
legitimate concerns that the rise of securitization makes it less likely
that large companies in financial distress will have unencumbered assets
on their balance sheets to satisfy any substantial portion of the claims of

* William Stamps Farish Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law. I thank
Allison Mann for unceasing aid of all kinds and Bill Powers for unstinting support. This paper
was prepared for a presentation at an April 2003 symposium on "Threats to Secured Lending" at
the Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. I thank the participants at that symposium for
thoughtful comments on my presentation. For comments on earlier drafts, I thank Jonathan
Lipson, Jay Westbrook, and Ernie Young.
I See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
1061, 1085-1106 (1996) (discussing the advantages ofsecuritization).
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unsecured creditors. 2 The balance between those concerns raises
questions that are as difficult to resolve here as they are in the context of
conventional secured credit, in which they have been a frequent topic
for decades. 3
What has brought those concerns to the forefront-and what
motivates me to write-is that States have been led by those concerns to
take the lead in attempting to decide how those issues will be resolved
in bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, this paper steps back from
that debate to ask a more fundamental question: who is to decide the
appropriate policy response to those issues? On the one hand, Congress
could decide those questions in the exercise of its exclusive
constitutional power to enact bankruptcy laws, 4 or, if it chose to do so,
in the exercise of its authority over interstate commerce. 5 Conversely,
States could resolve those questions in the exercise of their traditional
control over basic issues of commercial law, reflected most prominently
in the Uniform Commercial Code. Securitization raises difficult policy
questions in part because it falls at the boundary between those two
spheres: the effect and legitimacy of those transactions is plainly an
important question of commercial law, but much of what is most
important involves specific questions about how the transactions are
treated in bankruptcy.
This Article is distinct from the body of existing literature on the
topic because it does not focus on the commercial law questions
common to discussions of the topic (i.e., are the securitization
transactions efficient? Do they inappropriately undermine the stability
of originators?). Instead, it focuses on federalism questions: as a matter
of allocation of power, when does the supervening power of federal
law6 preempt state efforts to address those questions? 7
2 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. !, 23-30 (1996) (discussing
those concerns).
3 For summaries of the literature, see Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured
Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 628-29 (1997); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured
Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1073-83 (1989).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
5 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 See id. art. VI, § 2.
7 I am far from the first to see the federalism issues in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Thomas E.
Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063 (2002) (discussing framework for
when Congress must follow state law and when it is permissible to overrule state law); Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure
(Sept. 1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that bankruptcy law should
be understood as a federal procedural remedy for business distress). Neither of those papers
focuses on the federalism question at the core of the securitization debate. All accept (I think)
that Congress could reject at least the bankruptcy effects of the statutes I discuss in this paper.
The question of interest here is whether they are preempted by the existing statute - in a sense,
the question is whether the Bankruptcy Code as it now exists preempts those statutes. It is clear,
by the way, that the Bankruptcy Clause itself has no dormant preemption effect. E.g., Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 n.9 (1979) ("[S]tate laws are thus suspended only to the extent of
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This Article proceeds in three steps. Part I describes the basic
system that successfully delineated responsibility between Congress and
the state legislatures until recent years (perhaps about 1990), and a
number of systemic factors that have caused the old system to break
down.
Part II discusses examples of potentially problematic
legislation-not only legislation related to securitization, but other
pieces of state legislation that have their primary effects in the
bankruptcy of the affected parties. Finally, Part III uses these examples
to illustrate when those statutes should-and should not-be held
preempted by Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Code.
I.

THE OLD SYSTEM

The legal system that governs financing transactions traditionally
has been divided into two separate tiers: a federal tier of bankruptcy
rules and a state tier of commercial law rules. The Bankruptcy Clause
grants Congress authority to enact uniform laws about Bankruptcy, a
power that excludes parallel state legislation. 8 This power--dormant
through much of the 19th century9-has been exercised continuously,
and with increasing complexity, since enactment of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898. 10 At its core, this power defines the resolution of issues that
arise when businesses and individuals fail. I I
And even in the bankruptcy context, Congress traditionally has
refrained from enacting basic rules about commercial transactions and
the property rights that they create. For example, in Butner v. United
States, 12 the Supreme Court considered whether a mortgage extends to
rents collected from the collateral after the date of bankruptcy but
before the date of a post-bankruptcy foreclosure sale. The Court
rejected a lower-court rule that had articulated a federal common law
rule resolving that question. Rather, the Court held, the scope of the

actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress."); Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605,613 (1918) (same).
8 The breadth of that power was an important topic in the nineteenth century when Congress
had not enacted a permanent bankruptcy law. Compare Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122
( 1819) (invalidating state statute that discharged debt created by contract entered into before
statute), with Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (validating state statute that discharged debt
created by contract entered into after statute).
9 See, e.g., Charles J. Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L.J. 5, 13-14 (1995) (discussing early history of American bankruptcy law).
10 See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(2001) (discussing twentieth-century American bankruptcy law).
l l Chuck Mooney offers a revisionist view in which the basic function of bankruptcy law is
procedural-providing a unified (and thus necessarily federal) forum for the resolution of issues
of general financial distress. See Mooney, supra note 7 (manuscript at Part III.D).
12 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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security interest was to be resolved in,accordance with the laws of the
State in which the collateral was located. The Court explained:
Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in
the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within
a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping,
and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of
the happenstance ofbankruptcy.13
Similarly, in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 the Court helddespite language in § 548 that plainly would have supported a contrary
resultl5_that the federal bankruptcy system will not overturn the results
of a conventional real-property foreclosure that is properly conducted
under state law. 16 Thus, Congress generally has left it to the states to
provide basic rules that define property rights and establish ground rules
for the bulk of commercial transactions.
The Court's use of a strong interpretive principle to narrow the
substantive reach of the Bankruptcy Code is not unique to BFP. For
example, in Kelly v. Robinson, 17 the Court held that a discharge in
bankruptcy did not extend to restitution obligations imposed as part of a
criminal sentence, despite language strongly supporting a contrary
result. 18 Central to both these cases is a conscious reliance on principles
of federalism to justify a narrow interpretation of the statutory language.
For example, the first substantive part of the Kelly opinion discusses not
the statutory language, but the importance of taking account of
nontextual policies, prominently including the policy of federal respect
for state criminal proceedings reflected in Younger v. Harris . 19
Similarly, Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP places considerable weight
on the Court's sense of the importance of the relevant state interests:
Federal statutes impinging upon important state interests "cannot ...
Id. at 54-55.
511 U.S. 531 (1994).
15 Essentially, the Court held that the price at which an asset is sold is not relevant to the
question of whether the asset was sold for "less than a reasonably equivalent value" under the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000). See BFP, 511 U.S. at 549-59 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
16 511 U.S. at 536-46 (Scalia, J.). In fairness, I should mention that I argued the BFP case on
behalf of the Resolution Trust Corporation.
17 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
18 See Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 560-63 (1993) (discussing the nontextual
approach in Kelly).
19 See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47-48. (I clerked for Justice Powell the term that the Court decided
Kelly. It should go without saying that my comments on that case do not reflect his views.)
13

14
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be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of
government. . . . [W]hen the Federal Government takes over ...
local radiations in the vast network of our national economic
enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and
national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating [must
be] reasonably explicit."20
In addition to the authority granted by the Bankruptcy Clause, the
Commerce Clause doubtless grants Congress broad authority to regulate
all aspects of commerce. 21 Even in a post-New Deal world rife with
Congressional use of that authority, Congress traditionally has left it to
the states to enact legislation articulating the ground rules for
commercial transactions. 22 From a historical perspective that is not too
surprising. From the days of Lord Mansfield, the rules of commercial
law traditionally have been rules of common law. 23 Until the late 19th
century, it never would have occurred to anybody that it was a sensible
endeavor to codify those rules. 24 And thus, during the period of Swift v.
Tyson,2s those rules fell within the broad sweep of the American
common law system-the ultimate source of rules of decision was as
ambiguous at that time for commercial law as it was for any other topic
of common law. 26
What is surprising is the success of the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
achieving uniform enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. That
process has created an unusual situation: state laws that function as a
single American commercial law, substantially as uniform as a federal
statutory enactment. That early success may have something to do with
Congress's willingness to refrain for some time from preempting any
significant portion of the field. But it remains to be seen whether that
enterprise ultimately will turn out to be only a short post-Erie
interlude. 27 The growing difficulties that NCCUSL has had in drafting
20 BFP, 511 U.S. at 544 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947)) (alteration in original). The Kelly opinion
quotes the same passage. 479 U.S. at 49 n.1 l.
21 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating gun-free school zone
statute because it "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms").
22 See generally G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74
AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 239-41 (2000) (discussing the "federalist" nature of bankruptcy law).
23 See Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441, 447-52 (1979) (discussing the role of Judge Mansfield).
24 See id. at 456-60 (discussing the Negotiable Instruments Law, the first major codification
of American commercial law).
25 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).
26 See Mooney, supra note 7, at 89-102 (discussing the incoherence of Swift as it applied to
commercial law).
27 See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62
LA. L. REV. 1097 (2002) (discussing problems with the UCC process); Robert E. Scott, The Rise
and Fall ofArticle 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009 (2002) (same).
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and obtaining adoption of balanced legislation-the debacle of UCIT A
being the most obvious example28_have made it more common for
Congress to step in to the most traditional areas of commercial law.
The passage of E-SIGN in 200029 and the passage of the Check 21 Act
in 200330 are prime examples.
From the vantage point of the 21st century, the weakest point of
that two-tiered "system" of allocating rulemaking authority is the
boundary between the two tiers: whenever parties that have engaged in
commercial transactions file for bankruptcy, the rules for those
transactions will affect the outcome in the bankruptcy proceeding. The
problem that boundary presents is how to constrain the States from
"cheating" by writing rules that formally operate as ordinary rules of
commercial law but in fact are directed31 at situations of business
failure, i.e., state-promulgated bankruptcy-directed legislation. 32
The Bankruptcy Code itself includes a pair of formal limits on state
cheating-statutory provisions that invalidate state legislation if it too
brazenly attempts to influence bankruptcy outcomes. The first of those
deals with the Bankruptcy Code's recognition of the security interest
that has been elevated to prominence under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. States might attempt to cheat by characterizing
novel interests as security interests solely for the purpose of ensuring a
28 Originally intended to be a new article of the UCC, UCITA first was downgraded to a
uniform law (for which consent of the American Law Institute was not necessary). Finally, in
August of 2003, even NCCUSL dropped its support of the failed effort. See UC/TA Legislation is
Withdrawn After Widespread Opposition, LIBR. J. ON-LINE (Aug. 14, 2003), at
http://www.libraryjoumal.com/article/CA316182.
29 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229 (2000),
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.
30 Check 21 Act (also known as the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act), Pub. L. No.
108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-18 (2000)). The statute generally is
designed to facilitate the processing of checks by means of images instead of the cumbersome
paper originals. For explanation from the Federal Reserve (which drafted the statute), see Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act: About, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
paymentsystems/truncation/default.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2004). The same topic was within
the mandate of the Drafting Committee recently charged with promulgating revisions to UCC
Articles 3 and 4 (of which I was the Reporter). The Committee was unable to pursue that topic
because of its inability to produce a consensus regarding an appropriate reconciliation of the
interest in technological advance with the concerns of consumers about continuing to receive
their cancelled checks. The Federal Reserve, of course, is free to proceed at the federal level
without such a consensus.
31 The most difficult question in drawing the line between permissible and impermissible
state legislation probably is the question whether the key feature is the "intent" of the legislation
or its "effect." As I discuss in Part IV, my thesis turns on effect, not intent. Specifically, I argue
that statutes are impermissibly "directed" at bankruptcy if they have no substantial effect outside
of bankruptcy.
32 Marcus Cole explains that the potential for interjurisdictional competition is both the good
and the bad side of the federalist aspect of bankruptcy law: by leaving substantial policymaking
authority to the states, Congress has left open the possibility of the same kind of "race to the
bottom" that some scholars have discerned in American corporate law. See Cole, supra note 22,
at 238-39.
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good recovery in bankruptcy, even if the claim would not have a
substantial priority against conventional competing creditors. Section
544(a) responds to that concern by allowing the trustee in bankruptcy to
invalidate any claim that a lien creditor could defeat outside of
bankruptcy. 33 Thus, unless the state is willing to allow the interest
sufficient vigor in pre-bankruptcy priority disputes, the Bankruptcy
Code will not respect the interest in bankruptcy proceedings.
The second of the Bankruptcy Code protections deals with a timing
problem. States might create an interest of undoubted vigor-which
would defeat lien creditors and thus survive § 544(a)-but limit the
costs the interest would impose on conventional creditors by deferring
the effectiveness of the interest until bankruptcy proceedings. The
Bankruptcy Code invalidates those interests in § 545 not recognizing
any lien that is not "effective" before the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding. 34
Those statutes standing alone prevent certain types of blatant
intervention in the bankruptcy process. The question this paper
addresses is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts other less-blatant
interventions. As recent history illustrates, the specific provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code do not exhaust the potential devices that states might
use to interfere in the bankruptcy process. It may be that practical
circumstances limited the strain placed on those provisions for a
considerable time after their enactment. Most obviously, business
bankruptcy was relatively uncommon until the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.35 Because business bankruptcy was
relatively uncommon, there was a relatively small incentive for
creditors to invest resources in the development and enactment 'of
legislation in the area. That is not to say, of course, that business
failures were rare before 1978, or that lenders were not interested in the
terms of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. It is true, however, that federal
bankruptcy law is under more intense scrutiny now than it was a
quarter-century ago.
Related to that point is the obvious shift in the way in which
commercial law is made. When I was in school, I heard stories about
the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code by small groups of
scholars of daunting intellect in sultry Chicago summers without air-

33

11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2000).

34 Id. § 545(a)(l).

35 Chapter 11 filings (a major subset of business filings) have risen from 6,348 in 1978 to
11,270 in 2002. 2003 BANKR. YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 5 (Christopher M. McHugh ed.,
2003). Those filings are significantly under-inclusive because of the frequency of so-called
"Business I3s," Chapter 13 filings related to a business. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Searching for Reorganizalion Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1264-65 (1994)
(making that point).
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conditioning. 36
That era, when commercial law was something
"technical" to be resolved by "experts," has faded almost from memory.
Business bankruptcies are now an everyday affair--even for the largest
firms in the economy-sufficiently so that "bankruptcy planning" is a
central part of most major business transactions. 37 Similarly, specially
designed "bankruptcy remote" entities are now commonplace. 38 It is
not an exaggeration to say that every significant commercial financing
transaction is significantly shaped by an effort to avoid the potential
adverse effects of bankruptcy law.
Nor would we expect sophisticated creditors acting in a world
familiar with the precepts of public-choice theory to limit their efforts to
the design of the transactions in which they extend financing. The
process of crafting commercial legislation is now dominated by the
influence of the most directly affected interest groups, in most cases the
interests of some class of creditors or financial institutions. This is seen
quite clearly in recent experiences involving reform of the UCC and
bankruptcy laws. For example, although Article 9 successfully emerged
from the process and, indeed, has gained uniform enactment with great
speed, a dominant aspect of the process was a pitched battle between the
interests of secured lenders and consumers, a battle fought directly in
terms of the interests of those parties rather than any notion of "sound"
commercial principle. 39 Similarly, the most prominent feature of the
long-simmering effort at bankruptcy reform has been a major (and
successful) push by the credit-card industry to include in the legislation
"means-testing" principles that control the choice consumer filers make
between Chapters 7 and 13. 40
The interstate aspect of most insolvencies exacerbates the problem
considerably. The lack of symmetry between the scope of the typical
large-business bankruptcy and the jurisdiction of any particular state
creates a powerful incentive for self-dealing: the adoption of rules that
might favor the in-state interests in any particular bankruptcy, at the
expense of out-state interests not well represented in the local legislative
process. Thus, it should be no surprise that we now see a considerable

36 See Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Drafter: Allison Dunham, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 569
(1982). Of course, there always is the possibility that commercial-law drafting never was more
immune from interest-group pressures than it is now, and that "memories" of such a time are as
false as many nostalgic memories.
37 For example, the PLI database on Westlaw shows eighty-five presentations discussing
"bankruptcy planning" or "insolvency planning" since 1986. Practicing Law Institute database,
http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
38 Forty-four PLI programs discussed "bankruptcy remote[ness]" in 2002 alone. Id.
39 See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 614 (1998) (detailing the history of
that controversy).
40 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 12 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 3, 10-13 (2003) (discussing the push for those provisions).
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amount of legislation that directly tests the boundary between state and
federal authority. With this background, the next section describes
specific examples of such legislation.
II.

THE RISE OF BANKRUPTCY-DIRECTED LEGISLATION

To get a sense of the problem, this part considers three recent
examples of state legislation that could be characterized as bankruptcydirected legislation: Revised UCC section 9-408 (regarding security
interests in general intangibles),41 the definition of proceeds in Revised
UCC section 9-102(a)(64),42 and state legislation related to
securitization transactions. 43
A.

Security Interests in Intangibles

Revised UCC section 9-408 provides that a security interest in a
promissory note or a general intangible is valid, even in the face of a
term in the relevant document that forbids such an assignment. 44
Consider, for example, a software license that bars the licensee from
assigning the software to a third party. In the framework of an Article 9
loan to the software user, that license is a general intangible, the
licensor is the account debtor (the party obligated to perform under the
license), and the licensee is the debtor. 45 Subsection (a) of section 9408 invalidates the prohibition on assignment, permitting the licensee to
grant a valid security interest without regard to the terms under which
the software is licensed.
For present purposes, the problem is that subsection 9-408(d)
limits the effectiveness of the security interest so that the secured party
has no rights of significance under state law: it cannot use the collateral,
take possession of it, resell it, or in any other way "enforce the security
interest." The limitations are not at all unreasonable. For example, in
the context of the software license hypothetical introduced above,
federal law would arguably preempt any state law that validated a
transfer of the collateral without the consent of the licensor. 46 And, the
41 Revised U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000).
42 Id. § 9-102(a)(64).

43 See infra Part IV.
44 The provision also applies to an agreement relating to a health-care-insurance receivable.
For clarity of exposition, I omit express discussion of that portion of the provision.
45 See RONALD J. MANN & JANE KAUFMAN WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 517-21 (2002).
46 See Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
1996); see also In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 242-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(applying the Everex holding to a nonexclusive license of copyrighted videotapes).
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difficulty that a lender faces in transferring software "purchased" by its
borrower is central to the increasingly prevalent practice of software
financing. 47
But the fact remains that the UCC drafters' response to the
limitations of supervening federal law was not to forbid security
interests that would transgress on supervening federal IP-related policy
interests. Rather, their response was to permit the security interest as a
formal matter, but to strip it so completely of substantive effect as to
vitiate any substantial complaint on the part of those concerned about
the federal IP rules. 48
Comment 7 makes the reason for this odd resolution of the
problem clear: a specific and conscious intention of ensuring that the
rights of the lender would be treated as a secured claim in any
bankruptcy proceeding that later might arise. 49 Out of the many choices
available to the drafters, that particular choice is the one that raises the
concern about which I write-a classic case of bankruptcy-directed
legislation. 50

47 See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134,
151-53 (l 999) (discussing that problem).
48 The old Article 9 did not directly deal with the question. It invalidated anti-assignment
terms only in general intangibles "for money due or to become due," a category that would
exclude software licenses of the type discussed in the text. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1998). Thus, for
those licenses, the general rule applied that a lender was subject to all of the terms of the license
(including those that prevented the grant of a security interest). Id. § 9-318( I).
49 That comment explains: "This section could have a substantial effect if the assignor [that
is, the borrower/licensee] enters bankruptcy." The comment goes on to include a lengthy
example in which the effect of the provision is that the "security interest would attach to the
proceeds of any sale of the [business] while a bankruptcy is pending." Revised U.C.C. § 9-408
cmt. 7, ex. 4 (2000).
50 Comment 8 contends that "[t]he principal effects of this section will take place outside
bankruptcy." Id. § 9-408 cmt. 8. It is difficult to assess that contention in the variety of contexts
to which they might apply, but at least as far as software lending is concerned (the area with
which I have most familiarity), the only significant effect that the provision mentions is an
increase in lending that hypothetically should follow because of the improved outcome in
bankruptcy. See id. The comment also suggests obscurely that a lender "may ascribe value to the
collateral ... even if this section precludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest,"
at least in cases where the agreement of the licensor to the security interest will be forthcoming.
In the software context, that agreement is not likely ever to be forthcoming. See Mann, supra
note 47, at 152. Finally, the comment refers to cases in which the collateral might generate
proceeds to which Article 9 might apply. Again, that seems unlikely to be a significant issue
when the collateral is the licensee's interest in a nonexclusive license of software that cannot be
transferred or altered by the licensee. The most likely example is information that the borrower
might collect through use of the software. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised
Article 9 and the Negotiability ofInformation, 63 OHIO STATE L.J. 1327, 1374 (2002) (discussing
that possibility).
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Proceeds

The second UCC provision is the expansion of the definition of
proceeds in UCC section 9-102(a)(64). 51 Under the old version of
Article 9, proceeds were limited to "whatever is received upon the sale,
1::xchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."52
Thus, to focus on the most important limitation implicit in that phrase, a
security interest in proceeds would not cover anything that the borrower
received without disposing of the collateral. That limitation resulted in
a variety of holdings excluding from the reach of a security interest in
proceeds such things as dividends accruing with respect to stock and
rent received in return for a lease of the collateral. 53
Under the revised Article 9, the term "proceeds" is defined much
more broadly. The revised statute defines the term to include not only
"whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other
disposition of collateral"54-a version of old 9-306(1) broadened to
include leases and licenses-but also broader general categories like
"whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral" and
"rights arising out of collateral."55
There are of course valid commercial-law motivations for that
extension. The analogous provisions of the old version of Article 9
were plagued by frequent litigation that turned on obscure distinctions
with no obvious connection to issues of financing policy. 56 If the new
Article 9 ends such litigation by sweeping all conceivable interests into
the definition of proceeds, that may be a good thing-at least as a
matter of state commercial-law policy.s7
The problem for this Article, however, is that the broadening of the
proceeds interest in Article 9 could have important consequences in a
bankruptcy proceeding that has little or nothing to do with that policy.
The most obvious example arises from the use of the term "proceeds" in
Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)(l). 58 Section 552(a) creates a general rule
that property acquired by a debtor (or its estate) after bankruptcy "is not
51

Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64).

52 Id. § 9-306(1 ).

See Lipson, supra note 50, at 1373 (discussing those cases).
Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A).
55 Id. § 9-102(a)(64)(B) & (C); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Financing Information
Technologies: Fairness and Function, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1068, 1134-39 (discussing the breadth
of that phrase).
56 See Lipson, supra note 50, at 1372-78 (giving examples of conflicting results under the old
statute).
57 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13 (suggesting that broadened definition is designed to
"resolv[e] ambiguities" in old§ 9-306(1)).
58 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I) (2000).
53

54
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subject to any lien" resulting from a pre-bankruptcy security agreement.
Standing alone, that provision could have important effects on a
bankruptcy proceeding by causing the debtor to hold a substantial body
of unencumbered assets. The reach of that provision is limited,
however, by the exception in§ 552(b)(l) under which a security interest
does attach to any "proceeds" of collateral received by the debtor while
the bankruptcy is pending.
If federal courts interpret the reference to "proceeds" in § 552(b )(1)
as coextensive with the definition of proceeds in the revised Article 9,
the expansion of the definition will increase the likelihood that all
property the debtor acquires during the bankruptcy will be governed by
§ 552(b)(l), and thus that all property will remain encumbered despite
the seeming generosity of § 552(a). 59 It is difficult to assess the
practical significance of this change. After all, § 552(b)(l) extends the
creditor's interest not only to proceeds of collateral, but also to
"product, offspring, or profits of such property." It is possible that
many of the assets swept into the new definition of proceeds already
would have been covered by § 552(b)(l) even before Article 9 was
revised. 60 But, whether the effect is important or minor, the point
remains the same: if the expansion of the Article 9 definition was
directed specifically at bankruptcy outcomes, it goes at least a step
beyond the appropriate bounds of the state lawmaking process.

C.

Pro-Securitization Statutes

The final example is a more obvious one-state statutes designed
to foster securitization. As suggested above, the rise of securitization
transactions has produced a powerful impetus for legislation ensuring
that those transactions receive favorable treatment in bankruptcy.
Specifically, the goal is that the assets covered by those transactions
will be treated as sold from the originator (typically a large publicly
traded company, which ultimately will receive the funds generated by
the transaction) to the bankruptcy-remote trust that is the vehicle for the
transaction. 61 Thus, if the bankruptcy courts respect the design of the
transaction, a bankruptcy of the originator will not affect the securitized
assets, because they will not be property of the estate of the bankrupt
originator. 62
59 Ray Warner has discussed this problem in detail. G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy
Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AB! L. REV. 3, 62-66 (200 I).
60 For Ray Warner's argument that the expansion will have a major practical impact, see id. at
65-66.
61 E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539
(discussing those transactions)
62 E.g., id. (discussing the purpose of those transactions).
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The first round of this battle began with the decision of the Tenth
Circuit in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, holding that financial
assets sold by the debtor before its bankruptcy nonetheless would be
included in its bankruptcy estate. 63 The Permanent Editorial Board of
the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to limit the uncertainty caused
by that decision by its 1994 circulation of PEB Commentary No. 14.64
That commentary amended UCC section 9-102 comment 2 to
emphasize that nothing in Article 9 should be interpreted to stand in the
way of securitization transactions. Informed observers recognized that
this was not a problem to be solved definitively without more specific
statutory treatment.65
The issue became even more prominent during the 2002
proceedings in In re LTV Steel Co. 66 In that case, the bankruptcy court
permitted the bankrupt originator to use funds collected from previously
"sold" assets pending its analysis of the true-sale issue. 67 That incident
showed that the efforts to address the problem in the revised Article 9
(the topic of Jim White's paper at this conference) 68 would not be
entirely successful.
That continuing uncertainty about the bankruptcy treatment of
what is fast becoming one of the most important financial transactions
for large firms in our economy69 has led to a continuing push for
legislative action. For present purposes, the most important effect has
been the enactment of the burgeoning statutes that effectively offer
"check-the-box" treatment for parties entering secuntlzation
transactions. Generally, those statutes permit parties to obtain "true
sale" treatment simply by selecting the appropriate label for their
transaction. The most prominent example certainly is Delaware's
Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act, which provides that any assets
purported to be transferred in a "securitization transaction" "shall be
deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the transferor."70

63 995 F.2d 948,957 n.9 (10th Cir. 1993).
64 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB Commentary No. 14:
Section 9-102(l)(b) (June 10, 1994), reprinted in COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR CREDITOR LAW:
SELECTED STATUTES 1233 (2001).
65 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 748-49 (4th
ed. 1995) ( criticizing the revision as an ex ·post facto alteration of the statute and expressing a
"slightly squeamish" reaction to the use of a PEB commentary to address the problem).
66 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
67 Id. For a careful description of that incident, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset
Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRACTICE IOI,
I 07-08 (2002).
68 See James J. White, Chuck's and Steve's Peccadillo, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1743 (carefully
analyzing the drafting history of Revised U.C.C. § 9-318).
69 See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1117, 1129-1131, 114142 (2002) (discussing the importance of securitization, particularly for large firms).
70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2702A (2003).
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Similar statutes also appear in Alabama,11 North Carolina,72 and Ohio.73
Texas74 and Louisiana75 have adopted non-standard versions of UCC
Article 9 that have a similar effect.
The ultimate result of those statutes is striking. Even if the
attributes of the transaction-such as the credit risk retained by the
originator-are such that the asset would be considered not to have been
sold under traditional commercial-law principles,76 the transaction is
automatically treated as a true sale, removing the assets from any
subsequent bankruptcy of the originator. To put it another way, those
statutes allow the parties to have their transaction treated as a sale for
bankruptcy purposes without obligating the purchaser to take on the
risks that would be inherent in a complete transfer of the assets from the
purported seller. Again, because the principal purpose of those statutes
is to affect bankruptcy outcomes, they afford a prime example of
bankruptcy-directed legislation.
III.

RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM

The fact that states have chosen to enact legislation that affects the
outcomes of federal bankruptcy proceedings is not, standing alone,
adequate reason to invalidate those statutes. There are obvious reasons
to leave States with the broad authority to resolve commercial issues
that Congress traditionally has given them. Most obviously, leaving
71 ALA. CODE§ 35-lOA-2 (2003).
72 N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 53-424 (2004).
73 The Ohio statute, limited to failures of federally insured depository institutions, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § l 109.75(C) (2003), provides: "Any property, assets, or rights purported to be
transferred, in whole or in part, in a securitization shall be deemed to no longer be the property,
assets, or rights of the transferor." Id.§ 1109.?S(A)(l). With considerable pluck, the statute goes
on to provide: "In the event of the transferor's bankruptcy, receivership, or other insolvency
proceedings, the property, assets, or rights purported to have been transferred by the transferor, in
whole or in part, in a securitization shall not be deemed to be part of the transferor's property,
assets, rights, or estate." Id. § 1109.75(A)(3).
74 Texas has a non-uniform version of Revised U.C.C. § 9-109, which provides:
The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to
secure indebtedness but to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice
filing system. For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation,
the parties' characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive
that the transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and
equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of those assets
regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against the debtor, whether
the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any other term of the parties' agreement.
TEX. BUS. &COM. CODE ANN.§ 9.109(e) (2004).
75 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10:9-109(e) (2003).
76 For a lucid discussion of what those principles typically include, see Edwin E. Smith,
Proposal for a Uniform State Law on What Constitutes a True Sale of a Right to Payment (Sept.
26, 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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States room to resolve questions of commercial law furthers the interest
in having equality of outcomes in the pre-bankruptcy and bankruptcy
venues. 77 Thus, when a State adopts a statute that has substantial
application before and during bankruptcy proceedings, it is difficult to
view the State as having transgressed the limits on its authority. The
application of such a statute in bankruptcy is uncontroversial because it
is the commonplace working out of Congress's intent to incorporate
background state commercial-law rules into the Bankruptcy Code.
Whatever the reader might think about the value of working for
uniformity between pre-bankruptcy and bankruptcy outcomes, 78 it
seems clear that state reliance on such a principle cannot have a decisive
role in this context. For one thing, the statutes that raise a substantial
concern are those that have no significant effect outside bankruptcy.
Thus, it {s not a question of giving place to state rules to ensure
evenhanded application of rules in parallel state and federal forums. It
is much more-as my former colleague Jim White puts it-an effort by
state legislators to affect something beyond their reach: "[L]imiting a
trustee's rights by state law enactment is like trying to control an
obstinate robot from a remote location; sometimes the directions get
through and sometimes they do not. "79 Particularly important on this
point is the lack of symmetry discussed above: if the state is acting to
benefit localized in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state (or
broadly dispersed) interests, then the conditions that justify federal
deference to the State's determination are absent.SO As discussed below,
that seems to be true at least in the securitization examples.
What remains is to consider exactly what aspects of bankruptcydirected legislation are sufficiently offensive to the federal system to
justify invalidation. As I mentioned in the introduction, it is not so
much a question of commercial policy as it is a question of the
allocation of institutional authority.SI More specifically, it is a question
of preemption: does federal bankruptcy law preempt all or any of the
legislation discussed in Part 11?82
77 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 578
(1998) (discussing reasons why bankruptcy outcomes should match pre-bankruptcy outcomes);
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824-28 (1987) (same).
78 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (discussing

reasons why bankruptcy is inherently different from non-bankruptcy venues).
79 White, supra note 68, at 1755-56.
80 The point here is that in much of the commercial-law area the historical deference to statelaw rules makes sense only to the extent that the rules are uniform. Where the states are
competing to adopt non-uniform rules that favor a particular interest group, the system works
poorly. Notice that the problem is much more difficult here than in the corporate context, where
uniformity from state to state seems much less important.
81 See supra p. 1805-06.
82 As I mentioned above, preemption in this context must come from the Bankruptcy Code,
not the Bankruptcy Clause. See supra note 7.
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The Supreme Court, of course, has articulated a complicated (and
not entirely consistent) body of doctrine governing the question of
statutory preemption. Generally, federal statutes preempt state law in
five related and overlapping circumstances: if Congress says so in
express terms; if the federal scheme is so comprehensive as to support
the inference that Congress intended to occupy the field; if the federal
interest is so dominant that related state laws cannot be tolerated; if the
federal and state statutes actually conflict (so that compliance with both
is impossible); or if state law amounts to an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of the federal statute.s3
As a theoretical matter, application of that framework to the
bankruptcy context presents an odd and interesting situation. On the
one hand, Congress has enacted a complicated, pervasive, and exclusive
scheme of regulation-the Bankruptcy Code-which implements
specific and detailed resolutions of a wide variety of policy questions
raised in the context of the general default of an individual or business.
At the same time, Congress has specifically determined that numerous
aspects of that scheme should be defined by incorporation of rules that
States adopt from time to time. Thus, although the strength of the
federal interest, and the Constitutional mandate that it be implemented
in a uniform manner, would support a broad preemptive effect, the
manner in which Congress has implemented the mandate counsels in
just the opposite direction.
This tension would be a more difficult problem if the Supreme
Court made any effort to consistently apply the preemption doctrine
across different subject-matter areas. But in reality, because that type of
consistency is rarely achieved, it is no surprise that the Court's
prominent cases dealing with state property rights (specifically, BFP
and Butner) do not mention the rules discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, much less situate their analysis within the conventional
framework of preemption analysis.
Rather, these cases tend to
articulate two related points. First, as discussed above, they have
occasionally emphasized the Court's sense that Congress generally has
chosen to defer to the states on questions of general commercial law. 84
Second, BFP in particular reflects a deeply conservative 85 skepticism
about claims that ambiguous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code of

83 E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Hillsborough City v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
84 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
85 Here, I mean conservative in the status-quo sense rather than the political sense - the cases
do not seem to me necessarily to favor creditors over debtors. For discussion of that
understanding of conservatism, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean
Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N .C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
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1978 should be read to overturn long-settled practices of any kind. 86
That sentiment is not limited to BFP but has also featured in a
prominent line of cases over the last twenty years. 87
Read fairly, those cases do not suggest that the Court is any more
disposed to find a presumption against preemption88 in bankruptcy cases
than they are in any other area. 89 More plausibly, they reflect a selfeffacing unwillingness to rely on anything other than the clearest
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to support bold moves to preempt
transparently legitimate (although possibly ill-conceived) exercises of
state legislative policy. The rules in question are "transparently
legitimate" in the sense that there is no plausible basis for suggesting
that they were adopted for the purpose of altering bankruptcy outcomes.
The problem in Butner was whether federal law should reject or accept
the long-standing distinction between the "lien" and "title" theories or
mortgages.90 In BFP, the question was whether the Bankruptcy Code
86 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540-43 (1994)(discussing the historical roots
of fraudulent-conveyance law and emphasizing that "[f]raudulent transfer law and foreclosure law
enjoyed over 400 years of peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American jurisprudence until the Fifth
Circuit's unprecedented decision [that the Court rejects here]" (referring to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980))). It is
interesting to note that this line of thought does not appear at all in Butner v. United States, 440
U.S. 48 (1979). The most obvious explanation is that Butner arose under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, and that this concern did not come to the forefront until the Court began to face a barrage of
claims arising out of the much more comprehensive Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
87 The earliest cases articulating this principle under the Code were two opinions written by
Justice Powell shortly before his 1987 retirement: Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-47 (1986),
and Mid/antic National Bank v. N.J. Department of Environmental. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986). He rested the doctrine on two old (and theretofore little-noted) cases under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898: Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904), and Palmer v.
Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85 (1939). The doctrine has been repeatedly-some would say
woodenly-applied in the intervening decades. See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535,
539 (1996); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992); see also United States v. Ron Pair
Enters .. , 489 U.S. 235, 245-49 (1989) ( engaging in detailed treatment of the doctrine to justify
conclusion that pre-Code practice in Ron Pair was not dispositive).
88 The existence of a general presumption to that effect is oft stated by the Court, but not
followed with any discernible consistency. For a strong argument in favor of the presumption,
see Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law": Federal Preemption and State Autonomy
(2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). But see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA.
L. REV. 225 (2000) (criticizing the presumption against preemption).
89 But see Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 1539 (suggesting such a presumption). The Third
Circuit, for example, has come close to articulating such a presumption in its decisions in
Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1997)
(articulating a "restrained approach to concluding that Congress has intended to preempt state law
in the bankruptcy context," and noting that its approach "outside the bankruptcy context is
similarly restrained when considering areas that have traditionally been governed by state law")
and In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the right to cure a default
on a mortgage ends at the moment of a judgment of foreclosure; subsequently overruled by the
enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(I) (2000)). Although the Roach opinion does mention the
Court's general preemption analysis, it makes no serious effort to reconcile that line of reasoning
with its reliance on Butner.
90 Butner, 440 U.S. at 52-53; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES§ 4.1 cmt. a
( 1997) ( discussing those theories).
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was intended to overturn foreclosure sales conducted under
conventional (albeit problematic) procedures. 91 In neither case could it
have been suggested that the state-law rules were adopted with an eye to
bankruptcy outcomes. If the states were to be criticized for anything in
those cases, it was for failing to update their real-estate lending systems
to accommodate the realities of modem commerce.92 Indeed, one
reading of those cases is that their strong emphasis on the status quo
indicates that the Court would look critically at State efforts to alter
"traditional" bankruptcy outcomes.
To be sure, the Court in Butner strongly emphasizes the need to
maintain equality of outcomes between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
venues for traditional issues of state property law such as the
circumstances under which a lender can obtain rents from real-estate
collateral without foreclosing on the property.93 But that is a thin reed
to support validation of the kinds of bankruptcy-directed legislation
discussed in Part II. The only significant bankruptcy policy at issue in
Butner was the interest in uniformity-an interest that cuts in both
directions given the value of uniformity of rules for real estate in a
particular jurisdiction. Thus, under traditional preemption analysis it
would be difficult to criticize the result in Butner.94
More broadly, the Court's cases dealing directly with preemption
in the bankruptcy context reflect an aggressive willingness to discipline
state overreaching that undermines any effort to found a narrow
bankruptcy-preemption regime on BFP and Butner. To be sure, the
Court from time to time repeats the statement that the Bankruptcy Code
preempts state law only in the event of an actual conflict. 95 But on other
occasions the actual results of the cases that the Court has decided
demonstrate a deeply seated willingness to find preemption even when
it must rely on the vague possibility that state law operates as an
"obstacle" to the "purposes and objectives" of federal bankruptcy law.
This is particularly true in the cases decided shortly after the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,96 when Congress for the first time adopted a
91 BFP, 51 l U.S. at 540-43.
92 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES,§§ 4.1 (adopting the lien theory
of mortgages), 4.2 (adopting a coherent rule for perfecting a lender's interest in rents before
foreclosure).
93 Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-57.
94 The question is hypothetical in a sense, because Butner was not technically a preemption
case, but whether a case about the power of a federal bankruptcy judge to rely on "equity" as a
basis for recognizing a property interest that the state itself would not recognize. The distinction
seems to me unimportant given the close relation between preemption doctrine and statutory
interpretation. The ultimate question is whether the state rule will - or will not - apply in the
bankruptcy proceeding.
95 E.g., Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n .. 9 (1979) ("[S]tate laws are thus suspended only to the extent
of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress."); Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605,613 (1918) (same).
96 See Int'! Shoe v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929); Stellwagen, 245 U.S. at 613.
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permanent bankruptcy scheme and thus produced a practical need to
exclude the States from the field.
The leading case is Perez v. CampbeJl.97 In Perez, the Court
invalidated an Arizona statute that suspended a driver's license for
failure to pay a judgment discharged in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. The Court pointedly did not hold that the statute directly
conflicted with the discharge in bankruptcy. Rather, it emphasized that
'" [i]n the final analysis,' our function is to determine whether a
challenged state statute 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. "'98 The
adoption of that test was not boilerplate; the Court overruled two
previous decisions99 that had upheld similar statutes, asserting that those
cases had "ignored this controlling principle" 10o and thus created
"aberrational doctrine." 101 Indeed, of particular relevance for present
purposes, the Court went on to emphasize that its decision was
uninfluenced by evidence suggesting that such State statutes might have
been adopted for some purpose other than frustration of federal
bankruptcy policy:
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine ... that state
law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state
legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than
one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the
approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a
doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all
unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative
committee report articulating some state interest or policy-other
than frustration of the federal objective-that would be tangentially
furthered by the proposed state law.102
The Court reacted with similar vigor to state overreaching in
International Shoe v. Pinkus. 103 In that case, Arkansas adopted a statute
authorizing an insolvent individual to file suit seeking the appointment
of a receiver to take and distribute the assets of the insolvent
97 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
98 Id. at 649 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
99 Id. at 650-52 (overruling Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), and Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941)).
100 Id. at 650.
IO I Id. at 652.
102 Id. at 651-52. For an interesting lower-court application of that analysis, see Baker &
Drake, Inc. v. Public Service Commission (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.), 35 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir.
1994). That case considered a state statute requiring licensed cab drivers, which in the court's
view "was promulgated in part as a safety measure, and its substantive provisions do not facially
belie that goal." Id. at 1354. The court held the statute valid, even though it made
reorganizations more difficult, explaining: "Congress's purpose in enacting the Bankruptcy Code
was not to mandate that every company be reorganized at all costs, but rather to establish a
preference for reorganizations where they are legally feasible and economically practical." Id.
103 278 U.S. 261 (1929).

1824

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

individua1. 10 4 Under the statute, the receiver would liquidate the assets
and distribute them to all claimants that agreed to accept a distribution
as full satisfaction of their claims against the insolvent. 105 The case
arose when an individual who was not eligible for federal bankruptcy
relief (because of a discharge in bankruptcy less than six years earlier)
sought relief under the Arkansas statute. 106 A judgment creditor sought
to recover from the receiver without complying with the Arkansas
statute. 107
The Court started its analysis by emphatically adopting what we
would now call an implied preemption doctrine:
[T]he purpose to exclude state action for the discharge of insolvent
debtors may be manifested without specific declaration to that end;
that which is clearly implied is of equal force as that which is
expressed. The general rule is that an intention to wholly exclude
state action will not be implied unless, when fairly interpreted, an act
of Congress is plainly in conflict with state regulation of the same
subject. In respect of bankruptcies the intention of Congress is plain.
States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or
complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary
regulations. 108
Read through the lens of cases like Perez and Pinkus, it is easy to
conclude that bankruptcy-directed legislation often would be
preempted. To be sure, there is no basis for a claim of express
preemption or that Congress has occupied the field: the discussion
above makes it clear that there is an important role for state law in the
bankruptcy process. But Congress's decision to build the bankruptcy
system for the most part on preexisting rules of state property law
cannot plausibly be interpreted as giving the states blanket authority to
legislate in support of whatever bankruptcy outcomes seem desirable to
them. Rather, as Perez teaches, a state statute that has a substantial
effect only in bankruptcy is preempted whether or not it directly
conflicts with some specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 109 Such
Pinkus, 278 U.S. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
106 Id. at 264-65.
107 Id. at 263.
108 Id. at 265 (citations omitted); see also Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439,
447-48 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying on that statement in Pinkus to invalidate a state-law remedy for
violation of a reaffirmation agreement). For dictum (in a case rejecting preemption) to a similar
effect, see Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 615 (1918), stating that a conflict with federal law
would be intolerable if a "state statute is ... opposed to the policy of the bankruptcy law or in
contravention of the rules and principles established by it with a view to the fair distribution of
the assets of the insolvent," and also id., commenting that state laws "in aid of the Bankruptcy
Act can stand" and approving lower court analysis that validated state statutes as "in harmony
with the policy of the Bankruptcy Act and in aid of its purposes."
109 But see Nelson, supra note 88, at 265-90 (arguing that the Court should discard its
"obstacle" preemption doctrine).
104
105
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a rule at once accommodates Congress's intent to incorporate
background commercial-law rules into bankruptcy practice and at the
same time provides a limit beyond which states cannot go in attempting
to alter bankruptcy outcomes. It rests on the same intuition as
Bankruptcy Code sections 544 and 545-that States should not be able
to affect bankruptcy outcomes unless they are willing to apply the rules
to a substantial amount of pre-bankruptcy conduct.
To start with the easiest example, the pro-securitization statutes
reflect an obvious attempt to alter the content of the property of the
estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541. Absent those statutes, bankruptcy
courts would apply traditional principles to determine whether a seller's
obligations and risks with respect to securitized assets remained
sufficiently substantial to make those assets "property" of the bankrupt.
Only in the most hypothetical of transactions would those statutes have
any application outside of bankruptcy-indeed, several of them display
their intended substantive range by making specific references to the
intended bankruptcy effect. 110 The point of those statutes is to cause
bankruptcy courts to ignore those principles. Hence, a bankruptcy court
should ignore the label that any such state law might place on such a
transaction. 111 And, if the transaction is not a sale under conventional
principles, the assets that the transaction purported to sell should remain
in the estate of the bankrupt originator.112
Of course, it might cause considerable uncertainty for
securitization transactions if they were at risk in each case of a post-hoc
determination that the terms of the "sale" on which they rested were not
adequate. 113 In practice, however, I am not sure that is a major
problem-it may be that sophisticated lawyers in this practice know
when they have structured transactions that clearly conform to the
customary principles and know when they have come "close to the
line. " 114 On the other hand, if this became a serious problem, it would
11 O See

supra notes 73-74.
For analogous analysis, see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (holding that state
label of husband's rights as a tenant by the entirety was not dispositive of the question whether a
federal tax lien could attach to the husband's interest in property).
112 As I understood them, Thomas Plank's comments at the Conference suggest the view that
such a rule would exceed Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause. See Thomas E.
Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655
(2004). I disagree. Using Plank's own understanding of that Clause, I think it is well within
Congress's authority to define "property of the estate" to include assets over which the originator
retains such a significant degree of responsibility. See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1096-1100 (2002) (discussing Congress's power to
define property of the estate).
113 See Schwarcz, supra note 61 (characterizing the risk of judicial recharacterization as "the
strongest threat to securitization").
114 My views on that point are strongly influenced by listening to the conversations of
experienced lawyers on that point in recent meetings of a committee on capital markets formed by
the National Bankruptcy Conference.
III
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be easy enough to draft a statute setting out legislative safe harbors. 115
Moreover, if those safe harbors reflected customary principles of a sale,
the framework discussed here suggests that bankruptcy courts should
respect that statute even if it were adopted as a matter of state (rather
than federal) law.
The second example is Revised UCC section 9-408. 116 That
provision is categorically less objectionable than the securitization
statutes, because it does not reflect the kind of corrosive interstate
competition that is the fundamental basis for national power over
bankruptcy.111 However, that is not enough to save the provision.
Again, the question is not whether it would be a good thing for creditors
to have access to security interests in nonassignable intangible assets. 118
Rather, the question is whether the statute resolves that question in a
way that is properly within the purview of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee. The Committee's decision to resort to the odd device of a
security interest that has no effect of any substance except during a
bankruptcy proceeding 119 persuades me that this is not a proper exercise
of state legislative power. 120 Thus, I do not think a federal bankruptcy
court should respect an interest validated only by that section as a
"security interest" under Bankruptcy Code section 101(51). 121 In any
115
116
117

See Smith, supra note 76 (proposing such a statute).
Revised U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000).
See Cole, supra note 22, at 238-39. A statute designed for uniform nationwide adoption
cannot be the source of a race to the bottom.
118 I am inclined to think that the problem is not an important one, given the availability of
alternative transactional structures that lessen the importance of such an interest. See Mann,
supra note 47, at 167-79. I recognize, however, that the provision was thought to be of great
importance by representatives of a variety of affected industries that participated directly in the
drafting of Article 9. For a good summary of the potential benefits from the provision, see
Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non-Assignable Collateral Under Revised
Article 9, 9 ABI L. REV. 323, 329-39 (2001). For a critical assessment, see Lorin Brennan,
Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts,
23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 397-413 (2001).
119 See Warner, supra note 59, at 51 ("[T]he secured party's rights [under§ 9-408] outside of
bankruptcy are virtually non-existent."), 54 (characterizing § 9-408 as "bankruptcy-targeted
insolvency value reallocation rules masquerading as neutral principles of state commercial law").
120 This is quite different, for example, from the use of a statutory lien to appease a local
special-interest group. It may be that the state legislature adopting such a statute would be
engaged in the kind of corrosive interstate competition that is objectionable in our federal system.
But if the legislature is willing to give the lien priority and enforceability before bankruptcy - as
legislatures typically do - then the statute is not objectionable under the analysis that I propose
here. To be sure, Congress might choose to overturn the policy within the Bankruptcy Code. I
only suggest here that such a statute is not "implicitly" preempted by the existing Code. It is not
bankruptcy-directed legislation for a state to make a bad policy choice that applies both within
and outside bankruptcy. The proper framework for analyzing such a statute is the Commerce
Clause, which provides adequate protection for out-of-state businesses concerned about such
legislation. Compare, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating state
takeover regulation), with CTS v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding control-share
acquisition statute against such a claim).
121 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (2000). Thomas Plank argues that the interest should be valid in
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event, the great lengths to which the Committee was forced to go make
a statutory resolution of this particular case even easier: it seems almost
obvious that this is the rare example of a state statute that should fall
before the literal filter of Bankruptcy Code § 545 122 as a lien that is not
"effective" and "enforceable" before a bankruptcy filing.
The hardest example is the expanded provisions related to
proceeds. Those present a much closer question, because-unlike the
two previous examples-they do not reflect the direct enactment of a
rule that has effect only in bankruptcy. The broadened rule of proceeds
has considerable impact in a variety of contexts purely within Article
9.123 Moreover, Bankruptcy Code§ 552 is quite explicit in its adoption
of state-law principles as the foundation for its operation. 124 Thus, the
analysis of this Article suggests that the provision should not be
condemned as bankruptcy-directed legislation.
Still-and here the distinction between preemption analysis and
statutory interpretation is admittedly a fine one 125-a strong case can be
made that the expanded definition of proceeds should not alter the reach
of § 552. The ability-or inability-of a debtor's estate to acquire
unencumbered assets during the course of a bankruptcy directly affects
concerns at the core of bankruptcy proceedings, especially business
reorganizations under Chapter 11. Because Congress wrote § 552
against the background of the then-existing Article 9, the concerns
about maintaining the status quo that have animated the Court's
bankruptcy jurisprudence in cases such as Butner126 and BFP121 would
support an interpretation of the reference to "proceeds" that did not
change with the meaning of that term in state law. To put the point
more directly, it is fair to believe that the drafters of § 552 did not
intend that Section's balance between encumbered and unencumbered
assets to be subject to unilateral post-hoc expansion by the ALI and
NCCUSL through the UCC process. 128 Such a narrow view of the
bankruptcy, Plank, supra note 112, at 341-44, but he does not address my concern that the statute
has created an interest of primarily bankruptcy-related importance by systematically carving away
all substantial pre-bankruptcy effects that the interest might have.
122 11 U.S.C. § 545.
123 Among other things, they result in valuable security interests in collateral that is in the
hands of parties other than the debtor, security interests that presumably could be enforced under
Article 9 without regard to any bankruptcy proceeding involving the original debtor. See Lipson,
supra note 50, at 1373-74.
124 That section provides: "(The] security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring,
or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided by ...
applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 552.
125 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 807-12
(1994) (arguing that preemption should never be treated as distinct from ordinary statutory
interpretation).
126 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
127 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
128 Again, the best example of such a perspective is United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274
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reference to "proceeds" seems particularly plausible given the express
statutory authorization to courts to limit the§ 552(b)(l) interest "to any
extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities
of the case, orders otherwise." It is reasonable to think that in making
such a determination the court could endeavor to preserve the balance
that existed under the legal framework in existence at the time Congress
enacted the statute.

CONCLUSION

The ineluctable pressures of free trade and globalization are
making the American business environment ever more competitive. 129
That ensures, in turn, that state legislatures will more frequently in the
years to come be pressed to take sides in contentious issues about
commercial finance. The time will come when federal bankruptcy
courts must draw the line somewhere between their deference to those
enactments and the need to enforce uniform federal bankruptcy policy.
I hope this paper provides a first step toward understanding how and
where that line should be drawn.

(2002).
129 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION (1999).

